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In May 1996, FERC issued an annual license to Edison for the
continued operation of Project 1933. FERC would renew this annual
license automatically every year until it issued a new long-term license.
Trout sought to vacate this annual license until Edison received state
water quality certification.
Trout argued that the conflicting
provisions of the FPA and the CWA could only be "harmonized" by
issuing annual licenses when the state either granted or waived water
quality certification.
FERC held, and the court confirmed, that the issuance of an
annual license is an administrative or nondiscretionary act, requiring
FERC to authorize continued project operation under the terms and
conditions of the original license. Therefore, annual licensing is not a
licensing action that triggers the requirements of CWA. Furthermore,
the court looked at congressional intent of the CWA and stated that
Congress did not intend to restrict FERC's authority to prevent the
closure of a licensed project pending relicensing. Instead, the FPA
and the CWA function together because no new project license or
license amendment can issue without compliance with the state water
quality certification requirement of the CWA.
Erika Delaney Lew

League of Wilderness Defenders v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding pesticides sprayed from a plane constitute a point
source pollutant necessitating a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System permit, and requiring an analysis of pesticide drift
to supplement the Environmental Impact Statement).
The League of Wilderness Defenders and other environmental
groups ("League") brought suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon seeking an injunction preventing the United
States Forest Service ("USFS") from continuing to spray insecticide to
kill the Douglas Fir Tussock Moth ("moth"). The League claimed that
the USFS required a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit and revised Environmental Impact Statement
("EIS") for further spraying. The district court granted summary
judgment to the USFS on both issues. The League appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court, enjoining the
USFS from further spraying until it obtained an NPDES permit and
revised its EIS to consider the impact of pesticide drift.
The USFS initiated pesticide sprays in response to early warning
system predictions that a moth outbreak in 2002-2003 would result in
substantial defoliation. However, drift of the aerial pesticide used
possesses many potentially dangerous side effects including the
possibility of harming beneficial species, insect food supplies for fish,
and possible harm to birds and plants.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The League appealed three issues: (1) whether pesticides sprayed
from a plane constituted a point source pollutant, requiring an NPDES
permit; (2) whether administrative regulations and agency
correspondence containing interpretations of regulations exempted
USFS spraying from the NPDES requirement; and (3) whether the EIS
should consider the environmental impacts of pesticide drift.
The court first addressed whether the pesticides sprayed from a
plane constituted a point-source pollutant under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Under the CWA, discharge of a point source pollutant
requires an NPDES permit. Nonpoint source pollutants arise from
various dispersed activities whereas the statute clearly defines point
source pollutants. The court determined that the pesticide discharge
fell within the statutory definition of a point source pollutant since
pesticides constitute pollutants under the statute, and because the
spray arose from a "discrete conveyance," discharged by a "floating
craft."
Next, the court responded to USFS' allegation that regulations
issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") specifically
exempted silvicultural pest control from the requirement of obtaining
an NPDES permit. The court held that because the statute itself
clearly defined point-source pollutants, the administrative regulations
could not exempt silvicultural pest control since this would contravene
congressional intent. The court also found that the spraying could not
constitute a nonpoint source pollutant because the statutory language,
"natural runoff," modified the list of exempted activities. Since no
natural runoff caused the pesticide spray, the court found it could not
fit within the interpretation of a nonpoint source pollutant. The court
also discarded USFS's argument that specified point source pollutants
in the EPA regulation meant that silvicultural pest control could not
constitute a point source pollutant. The court found that such
specification only prevented removing the four specified point
sources, but did not exclude other point sources such as pesticide
spray.
The court held that informal correspondence from the EPA failed
to exempt USFS from the NPDES permit requirement.
The
documents included one line in a guidance manual and two short
letters, which the court found lacked sufficient analysis to constitute an
exemption. In addition, the court held that while the EPA may define
point sources when reasonable room to interpret them exists, the EPA
may not do so when such an interpretation contravenes the will of
Congress. Because the informal correspondence lacked analysis and
contravened the intent of Congress, it failed to exempt USFS from the
NPDES permit requirement.
The final issue the court addressed involved the EIS required for
spraying. The League challenged the EIS, claiming that it lacked
analysis of the potential environmental impact of pesticide drift. The
court agreed, finding that the EIS totally failed to address the issue of
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pesticide drift, and also failed to sufficiently analyze potential
mitigation measures.
JaredEllis

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
McAbee v. City of Fort Payne, 318 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the limitation on actions provision of the Clean Water Act may
preclude a citizen suit only if the state laws under which the state is
bringing or has brought the enforcement action contain public
participation provisions that are roughly comparable to the analogous
Clean Water Act provisions).
Kim McAbee commenced a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") against the City of Fort Payne, Alabama ("City") for violation
of their state issued National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Permit ("NPDES"). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Alabama denied the City's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the public participation provisions of the Alabama
Environmental Management Act and the Alabama Water Pollution
Control Act were not comparable to the CWA provisions, and did not
preclude McAbee from bringing a citizen suit. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court, holding the statutes were not comparable as a matter
of law.
McAbee alleged that the City violated its NPDES issued by the State
of Alabama. At the time McAbee filed suit, the City was already
operating under an enforcement order issued by the Alabama
Department of Environmental Management for a number of previous
permit violations. The final order provided for a monetary penalty to
be assessed against the City and ordered the City to provide notice of
the violations and penalties in the newspaper. The City's news article
stated the name of the plant and the penalties imposed, but did not
provide notice that citizens wishing to appeal the penalties and
findings stated in the enforcement order had only fifteen days to raise
such appeals.
The "Limitation on Actions" provision in the CWA precludes
citizens from bringing citizen suits for CWA violations provided the
state is diligently prosecuting an action or has issued a final order
under state law comparable to the analogous CWA provisions.
Therefore, the issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in
holding that the Alabama statutes were not comparable to the CWA
provisions. The court rejected the City's argument that the statutes
need only be comparable as a whole, and held that each provision in
the state law should be "roughly comparable" to the equivalent CWA
provision. Applying the test of rough comparability, the appellate

